Nudges, i.e., low-cost interventions that steer people's behavior without compromising their freedom of choice, are the key contribution of 'Libertarian Paternalism' (LP) to public policy. They typically work through either harnessing or responding to people's cognitive biases and heuristics -which is why they have been criticized for being manipulative and for compromising personal autonomy. We argue, though, that (i) nudging hardly compromises autonomy, properly understood, and that (ii) it rather risks undermining people's agency, i.e., their ability to engage in creative self-constitution over time. This reorientation has farranging implications for the ethics of behavioral policies in general and LP in particular.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since its introduction, in 2008, by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, the concept of 'nudging' has provoked a lot of discussion in academia, policy circles, and the general public.
1 The term stands for policy interventions that aim at influencing people's behavior without changing their choice sets. Through the design of the choice architecture (i.e., their decision context), agents are supposed to be steered in a particular direction, while retaining the freedom to choose otherwise: To illustrate, a cafeteria manager can influence his clients' choices through the way he arranges the food on display; an employer can foster her employees' savings decisions by making enrolment in 401(k) pension schemes the default, with an easily available 'escape clause'. 2 Nudges can however also be used for nonpaternalistic purposes, such as promoting pro-environmental behavior (e.g. Pichert and Katsikopoulos 2008) . Since they typically work their magic by purposefully harnessing people's cognitive biases, many critics find nudges objectionable for treating people disrespectfully by compromising their personal autonomy. We can expect Big Data to widen the realm of applications considerably in the future, thereby giving rise to interesting ethical questions.
This paper discusses the ethics of public (i.e. government-issued) nudging, in particular its normative costs in terms of autonomy or self-government on the one hand and agency on the other hand. 3 Specifically, we ask two questions:
(i) Do nudges compromise the autonomy, properly understood, of the agents exposed to their influence, or rather some other value?
(ii) Which implications follow from the answer to (i) with respect to the design of people's choice architecture (of which nudges are a part)?
1 See in particular , Sunstein (2003, 2008) , Sunstein (2014) . See Rebonato (2012: 257f ., endnote 1) on the substantial impact that the overarching program of 'Libertarian Paternalism' has had on public policy in the U.S., the UK and elsewhere. As to the U.S., see the executive order No. 13,707, 80 Fed.Reg. 56, 365-66 (Sept. 15, 2015) , http://perma.cc/FDR2-VX3T. Related approaches to are Camerer et al. (2003) and Loewenstein and Haisley (2008) . For what it's worth, preliminary evidence shows that nudges may be more popular than most critics care to concede (e.g., Hagmann et al. 2015; Tannenbaum et al. 2014) .
2 See Thaler and Sunstein (2008: 1-3) , Thaler and Benartzi (2013) . 3 A note on terminology: In what follows, 'nudges' will be understood as public nudges; 'autonomy' will be understood in the sense of accountability-conferring 'personal autonomy' (as opposed to 'legal autonomy', say) and as a capacity, i.e. as a matter of degree (as opposed to, say, an absolute right, see Feinberg 1986 ). And by 'agency', we refer to the individual's capacity to constitute herself as an agent, a task that takes a lifetime (Korsgaard 2009 ). Note that Sunstein (2015c) seems to use that term in a different way.
given biases -, thereby disregarding the peculiarities of processes of preference formation.
Autonomy and agency, though, are all about the formation of preferences: Strictly speaking, they don't concern the nominal freedom to act upon one's given preferences (that's freedom of choice), 9 but rather the way an agent forms them in the first place and follows through on them -freedom of will (Fischer and Lotz 2014) , hence something economics is typically silent about: For instance, economists' somewhat truncated understanding of autonomy as 'consumer sovereignty' simply posits to respect an agent's given, complete and consistent preferences as the only source and ultimate measuring rod of normative judgments. 10 Quite obviously, this is of little help in a behavioral world (Sugden 2004 ).
As we will show, a closer look at the issue of human preference formation with limited mental resources reveals not only that human preferences are context-dependent (in behavioral economics parlance: they are constructed), but also that real-world individuals need to rely on contextual features -of an institutional, situational and interpersonal kind -in order to either construct their preferences in the first place, to make them effective (i.e., to act upon them), and ultimately to constitute themselves as agents. In other words, agents exhibit, as a key consequence of their bounded rationality, what Davis (2014) refers to as 'bounded individuality': Their preferences -and, hence, their identity -are partly endogenous to their environment. 11 In light of this, we submit that what's really at stake in nudging is not people's autonomy but rather their agency, i.e., their capacity to engage in the ongoing, specifically human, project of identity formation or self-constitution (Korsgaard 2009 ). In terms that might sound paradoxical, nudges may give rise to 'excessive convenience'.
The argument proceeds as follows. Section 2 prepares the conceptual ground for discussing the impact of nudging on autonomy. Section 3 gives a critical overview of autonomy conceptions used in the extant literature on the ethics of nudging. We suggest to overcome the issues identified there by introducing an alternative account of autonomy suggested by Sarah Buss. In section 4, drawing on work by James Buchanan and Christine Korsgaard, we submit that what's really at stake in the ethics of nudging are its effects on people's agency. We also suggest some implications. Section 5 concludes.
9 In order to clarify the ethical debate on nudging, it's crucial to keep these values apart. With respect to the freedom dimension, most contributions to the debate presuppose negative freedom. Discussing nudging from the viewpoint of alternative notions of freedom obviously deserves further research (but see Grüne-Yanoff 2012 , Mills 2013 . 10 See, e.g., the principle of 'preference autonomy' suggested by Harsanyi (1982: 55) 
PREPARING THE GROUND
Before we can discuss the conceptions of autonomy used in the critical literature on nudging (we'll do that in section 3), some conceptual groundwork is in order. Two things, in particular, need to be clarified at the outset.
First, what are nudges anyway? There has been some controversy on how to specify this innovative set of public policy instruments. A key problem is that nudges are often defined in a very broad way, to also encompass the mere provision or disclosure of factual information, a measure that not only lacks originality (Rebonato 2012) , but that also does not raise interesting ethical questions. To illustrate, Thaler and Sunstein (2008: 6) define nudges as 'any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid.' There has to be an easily available escape clause. This definition has been criticized extensively. 12 We submit to follow Hansen (2015) and focus on the notion, originally advanced by Thaler and Sunstein (2008: 8, emphasis added) themselves, that 'a nudge is any factor that significantly alters the behavior of Humans, even though it would be ignored by Econs', where 'Humans' refers to real-world individuals with limited mental resources, and 'Econs' refers, basically, to Homo
Economicus. Adding the crucial aspect of intentionality, we suggest defining nudges as interventions that aim at altering people's behavior by either (i) harnessing cognitive biases or
(ii) responding to them. To illustrate, consider the deliberate change of defaults on the one hand, and the introduction of cooling-off periods on the other hand. Understood this way, nudges should be considered the actual original and imaginative contribution of LP to public policy-making.
Crucially, all definitions offered so far include a basic transparency requirement - Thaler and Sunstein (2008: 244) , for instance, suggest the Rawlsian 'publicity principle', according to which government should be banned 'from selecting a policy that it would not be willing or able to defend publicly to its own citizens.' 13 While this particular way to 12 See, e.g., Hausman and Welch (2010) , Hansen (2015) , Hansen and Jespersen (2013) , and Mongin and Cozic (2014) on the way in which Thaler and Sunstein define and use several key terms. For instance, the aspect of intentionality is missing in the first sentence quoted above -it's, however, crucial to distinguish mere choice architecture from purposeful nudging (Barton and Grüne-Yanoff 2015) . Note that Sunstein himself still sometimes confounds both, as e.g. in Sunstein (2015a: 6, 9 ). Barton and Grüne-Yanoff (2015) define a nudge as 'an intervention on the choice architecture that is predictably behaviour-steering, but preserves the choice-set and is (at least) substantially noncontrolling [i.e., there's an easily available escape clause, C.S.], and does not significantly change the economic incentives', which is still somewhat unsatisfying ('economic'? 16 To illustrate, the 'new policy tools' described by Chetty (2015: 6-12) are examples of behavioral policies. 17 Consider the subfield of behavioral economics studying 'ego depletion' (e.g. Baumeister and Tice 1998). mental resources; this will typically also include some (intentional) nudging, especially so when confronted with complex or new decision problems (Schubert 2014 Marneffe (2006: 81) . All this flies in the face of the standard economist's assumption that autonomy is positively correlated with the size of an agent's opportunity set (i.e., the accuracy of perceived opportunity costs). 19 In Valdman (2010: 762) , the (total) outsourcing of self-government means 'relinquishing your final authority as the arbiter of your actions', not just 'deferring to some advisor's judgment'. You may read this as adystopian -case of technologically perfect nudging. 20 To see this, consider the harnessing of framing effects: To the extent that the agent lets himself be influenced by them, he 'delegates' parts of his deliberation to some contextual factor (i.e., a part of the choice architecture). Analogous reasoning applies to the impact of graphic images, but also of prompted choice: in these cases, the effort to overcome self-control issues is partly delegated. With deceiving road markings, the effort is also delegated in the sense that the choice architecture relieves the motorist from cognitive overload. In the case of cooling-off periods, the agent can be described as delegating parts of his deliberation to his own, future, self. 21 That question is rarely asked in the literature -but see Kirchgässner (2015: sect. 3) and Schubert (2014) . 22 Paternalism is standardly defined as a welfare-improving intervention that's unwanted (e.g. Dworkin 2014) . 23 'Manipulation' is a value-laden term. Let's define it, crudely, as the deliberate harnessing of an agent's biases using stealth. Genuine (i.e. transparent) nudging can only be manipulative in the limited sense that, say, being the voluntary object of emotional seduction might be characterized as being manipulated (Buss 2005: 212f.) ; As Sunstein (2015b: 7f.) puts it, 'within limits, being manipulated can even be fun. In some forms, manipulation is a form of play.' (see also circumstances, nudges can be reconstructed as tools of 'behavioral self-commitment' or 'selfnudging' (Lades 2014 ) that people deliberately employ to further their own goals. Consider re-arranging the food in your fridge in order to fight unwanted temptation. To be sure, doing so requires skills, perhaps particularly the ability of self-control (which may, of course, be supported in turn by a successful self-nudge).
So, human agents always require some nudging. This implies that when debating the ethics of nudging, we should stop idealizing the institutional status quo. Most critics seem to implicitly assume that before the implementation of public nudges, people act upon preferences that are somehow 'pure' or 'undistorted', and that public nudging then spoils the show by distorting processes of preferences formation. This is misleading. For in a behavioral world, processes of individual preference formation are highly context-dependent, i.e., they are heavily influenced by the given choice architecture, and in a mostly subconscious manner to boot (e.g. Felsen and Reiner 2015) . As Reiss (2013: 299) puts it, 'humans with bounded rationality and willpower are subject to myriad influences anyway, and most of them do not aim to improve consumer well-being' -which implies that the notion of 'authentic' preferences does not make conceptual sense (Fischer and Lotz 2014: 11) . 24 The institutional status quo is not characterized by a perfectly 'neutral' choice architecture, but rather by set of contextual factors that, while partly the result of random (thus, 'neutral') processes, are also the product of intentional and often harmful private nudging -most likely promoted rather than discouraged by market forces (Akerlof and Shiller 2015, Bar-Gil 2012) -and all kinds of regulations and social norms. 25 Consequently, nudging should be understood as a marginal redesign, adjustment or correction within a specific domain's given, highly complex choice architecture, rather than as the introduction of an additional, hitherto unknown kind of 'distortion'.
Our two clarifications -nudging (properly understood) answers to cognitive biases, and there are no 'pure' preferences in the first place -allow us to finally take a critical look at the autonomy conceptions that seem to inform the extant ethical debate on public nudging. 24 Talking about 'undistorted' preferences might also suggest that only 'natural' or 'non-artificial' preferences (whatever that means) deserve to be respected, a view rightly criticized by Hayek (1961) . 25 Note that while the non-neutrality of the given choice architecture is certainly unavoidable, nudgingunderstood as the deliberate attempt to steer people in certain directions without curtailing their choice sets -is not. It's true that, say, a default is sometimes inevitable, but that does not imply that it must be chosen with the aim of steering people in certain directions. Moreover, it may often be possible to replace it by mandatory choice.
ON CONCEPTIONS OF 'AUTONOMY'
Autonomy is, of course, a key component of most conceptions of the good life -a part of what makes a life worth living 26 -and widely perceived to be the key ethical value at stake in nudging. In order to probe whether a given conception of autonomy can be coherently applied in the context of nudging, we will examine whether it can be coherently applied in our behavioral world. Let's call this standard the criterion of external coherence (EC). Most contributions to the ethics of nudging seem to be informed by what may be referred to as the received view on autonomy.
The received view and its discontents
What exactly does it mean to enjoy self-government, to determine the direction of one's own life, to 'own' one's actions in a way that grounds accountability? What's the special selfrelation that makes an agent act 'autonomously'? Apparently, some of the authors mentioned above subscribe to the received view -rather, a family of related views -in contemporary accounts of autonomy. They share the view that a given agent acts autonomously to the extent that he's a 'super agent' (Buss 2012: 656, 678) : He puts a lot of critical reflection into the formation and adjustment of his motives, which makes him respond the right way to changes in incentives. Let me give two examples.
Hausman and Welch (2010: 128, FN 16) take autonomy to mean 'the control an individual has over her own evaluation, deliberation and choice' (my emphasis; see also Mills 2013: 30-32) . Nudges would then compromise an agent's autonomy to the extent that they influence her behavior by harnessing certain cognitive biases, rather than by trying to engage her deliberative faculties (through means of rational persuasion, say). In other words, by circumventing the agent's deliberative faculties, the control she exercises over her own will would be undermined (ibid.: 130), making her a passive bystander to her own actions. 27 To illustrate, on this view a purposeful change of defaults would qualify as autonomycompromising to the extent that its power is due to the fact that defaults make agents believe to somehow 'possess' the default option, thereby exploiting their loss aversion (Smith et al. 2013 ). On the other hand, cooling-off periods may, on this view, enhance people's autonomy (Hausman and Welch 2010: 132f. : 208f.) . To the extent that nudges make use of such non-rational causal factors, then, they would compromise people's autonomy. 30 Bovens goes on to argue that the coherence (or rather lack thereof) of the preference structure an agent ends up with after having been exposed to nudging may serve as an indicator of autonomy losses. With fragmented preferences, an agent risks being eventually unable to recognize herself in her own actions (ibid.: 212-14). Aesop's famous fox is a case in point (Elster 1982) :
Seeing that some high-hanging grapes he originally longed for are out of reach, he dismisses them as 'sour anyway', thus displaying adaptive (read: incoherent) preferences, rather than genuine preference change -by acting 'out of character', he gains in terms of welfare, while losing in terms of autonomy.
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So far, philosophers don't have trouble following the debate on the ethics of nudging.
Yet, an alternative account has been suggested that goes beyond the received view by focusing on an individual's subjectively perceived autonomy: When people feel manipulated, they suffer in terms of procedural utility -for the subjective experience of self-determined choice can be hedonically valuable (e.g. Frey et al. 2004 Binder and Lades (2015) who seem to equate autonomy with neoclassical utility maximization. 30 See also Nagatsu (2015: sect. 4) on using responsiveness to reasons as a criterion for autonomous action. 31 Another manifestation of the 'super agent' view of autonomy, due to Frankfurt (1971) , requires the agent to adopt some 'higher' standpoint and endorse (or identify with or at least to be non-alienated toward) not just the psychological elements involved in the formation of her preferences, but rather her preferences themselves or, alternatively, their historical genesis (e.g. Christman 2005 ). To our knowledge, this account has not yet been explicitly used in ethical discussions on nudging, despite its popularity in contemporary ethics (Buss 1994: 95f.) .
that the debate on nudging should focus on its impact on people's perceived rather than their actual autonomy (see also Rebonato 2012: sect. 8.3).
Let's simplify things and denote the set of psychological factors that enter the process of preference formation as F. Then, the accounts of autonomy used so far in the literature on the ethics of nudging can be roughly summarized as defining autonomous action through a focus on (i) the relationship between the agent's 'self' and F ('control'), (ii) the self's 'correct' way of processing reasons (i.e. a subset of F acknowledged as having that status), (iii) the quality of the product of F, viz., the preference or the action itself ('coherence'), and/or (iv) the subjectively perceived relationship between the agent's self and F ('procedural utility'). At first sight, these look like intuitive requirements of autonomous action. As we will argue, though, the corresponding accounts of autonomy cannot be coherently applied when it comes to assessing the normative costs of nudging. What, exactly, is wrong with them?
First, the notion of 'autonomy as control' presupposes a level of self-knowledge on the part of the agent that cannot be found in a behavioral world. A realistic model of man should take account of the fact that human behavior is typically influenced by a variety of causal factors operating at a subconscious level. This implies that the level of self-knowledge or selftransparency implicitly assumed in such accounts lacks descriptive accuracy. We rarely have access to the deep psychic sources of our motives (Buss 1994: 96) . 32 The self can misunderstand itself. It may even want to misunderstand itself: Self-deception has been uncovered as an important source of well-being in behavioral economics.
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Second, the conception of 'autonomy as responsiveness to reasons or reasoning'
violates the EC criterion by virtue of implicitly assuming that there is in fact a definitive set of 'correct' reasons or ways of reasoning that make the resulting preferences truly autonomous (Nagatsu 2015: sect. 4) . Given the large variety of factors that enter processes of preference formation in a behavioral world, it seems arbitrary to single out some of them as 'autonomous', while dismissing all others as 'undue external influences'. In other words, this account is closely linked to specific -notoriously controversial -conceptions of rationality.
To illustrate, the influence of framing is often seen as a paradigm case of heteronomy. This makes perfect sense if we accept homo economicus as the role model of correct decision- viewpoint of alternative conceptions of rational behavior, such as the account of ecological rationality (Smith 2003 , Berg 2014 , according to which a choice that is inconsistent with the laws of logic can nonetheless qualify as 'ecologically rational' by virtue of reflecting a good enough fit between the agent's mind and her decision context. What looks 'irrational' from a standard economics viewpoint, may very well prove beneficial for the agent concerned (Gigerenzer 2015) . Whichever concept of rationality we prefer -we should not build a conception of autonomy on the shaky ground of controversial notions of rational action.
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Third, the notion of 'autonomy as coherence of the product of deliberation' can also be argued to violate EC: for instance, it's obviously not applicable when preferences are incomplete (see also Nagatsu 2015: sect. 4).
Fourth and finally, the introduction of subjectively experienced, procedural utility aspects does not (yet) offer us a reliable measuring rod that can be used to assess the normative costs of nudging. Epistemic Privilege, which we will introduce presently (see section 4, below).
Hence, we have seen that the accounts of autonomy that are typically referred to in the extant literature on the ethics of nudging cannot be coherently applied in our context. Let's see whether there is an alternative account of autonomy that might do the job.
Linking autonomy to identity
Sarah Buss has developed a conception of autonomous action that, we submit, overcomes the issues marring the accounts described above. 36 We will discuss it briefly in this subsection, concluding that when properly understood, autonomy can hardly be seen as the value that risks being compromised by nudging. Rather, what's arguably at stake is people's agency, as we will show in section 4.
Buss rejects the 'super agent' view of autonomy, sketched above, mainly for a simple reason: people are typically also held morally accountable for actions they do habitually, 34 Buss (2012: 664f.) rejects this account of autonomy on yet other grounds: We can easily imagine cases where someone responds perfectly well to reasons, yet her resulting action can nonetheless hardly be judged autonomous (in the accountability-conferring sense) -to illustrate, consider the woman overcome by fear when threatened by a rapist. 35 Consider the well-known experience machine described by Nozick (1974: 42-45) . 36 See in particular Buss (1994 Buss ( , 2005 Buss ( , 2012 .
akratically, unwillingly, or even thoughtlessly (Buss 2012: 651, 655) . 37 It seems that neither doing something (such as: deliberating) nor being satisfied with something (the products of one's deliberation) can be considered the key to the particular self-relation that makes an agent act autonomously (ibid.: 656).
What's the alternative, then? Buss' key argument can easily be understood along the lines of our EC criterion: Since in a behavioral world, no agent can deliberately influence all her deliberations and endorsements, the factor that makes an agent act autonomously must be located in the passive ('nonagential') role he plays when forming his preferences. 38 Agents are inevitably passive in relation to most of the (disposition-shaping) psychological factors that causally influence their practical reasoning at any given moment. 39 Buss submits that someone's autonomy depends on the extent to which he 'can be identified with the direct, purely causal, nonrational influences' on the formation of his preferences (ibid.: 658).
While this reflects the general intuition that autonomous action is closely related to action that expresses someone's 'character', Buss now faces the challenge to capture the intuition that acting 'out of character' typically does not prevent someone from being held accountable for his actions (the terms 'character' and 'identity' will be used interchangeably in the following). 40 What makes an agent act autonomously, on Buss' view, is the fact that his preferences either reflect his character or otherwise were 'directly caused by a psychological and/or physiological condition that is not at odds with minimal human flourishing' (ibid.: 659). Buss relies heavily on what she refers to as the 'human flourishing condition' -implying that the (ultimately metaphysical) distinction between autonomy and heteronomy has to be informed by the normative notion of what makes a human life go well.
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Accordingly, Buss relaxes the condition (popular with standard accounts, see above) that to be autonomous -i.e., to play a decisive role in one's own preference formation -, requires a special way to exercise one's agential capacities. In contrast, she appeals to the 'identity all 37 See also Buss (1994) for a thorough critique of the popular endorsement account of autonomous action. 38 Buss talks about 'intentions', but let's stipulate that nothing of substance is lost when we translate that into the term 'preferences', which is economese for 'motives'. 39 For Buss, autonomous action is necessarily 'self-determination in the passive mode' (ibid.: 657). She sees passivity 'at the heart of all agency', for 'nothing active can sustain its activity without passively relying on everything that makes this activity possible' (ibid.: 658, see also 684) -a striking echo of Sunstein's point that it's the choice architecture surrounding us that makes agency possible (see sect. 2, above). 40 See (ibid.: 663). To be sure, the relevance of (more or less stable) character traits for explaining behavior is contested (see, e.g. Sreenivasan 2002 ), but that particular debate is of little relevance to our argument. 41 Buss (2012: 672-685) It's worth noting that Buss' account seems to be the only one among those discussed so far that takes seriously the intuition that self-government ('autonomy') is ultimately about a special way of relating to oneself -as opposed to relating, say, to Reason (ibid.: 666). Buss' account is quite undemanding in proposing that 'when our intentions are determined by physiological and psychological states that do not typically prevent human beings from functioning minimally well', we act autonomously. Interestingly, on Buss' view, thepossibly highly manipulative -manner in which an agent has acquired his character or personality does not compromise his autonomy, as long as the agents' preferences subsequently reflect the 'decisive influence of their character' (ibid.: 688). Analogous reasoning applies to the notorious case of the indoctrinated woman displaying adaptive preferences: 44 Unless she is prevented from functioning minimally well as a human being, her autonomy is not compromised (ibid.: 689; see also Buss 1994: 96) .
What, then, follows from this? Quite obviously, genuine public nudging will hardly ever have a compromising impact on autonomy in Buss' sense. On the contrary, to the extent that it succeeds in facilitating certain choices, it may help prevent agents from falling into debilitating conditions, thereby enhancing their autonomy. We submit, then, that contrary to 42 This shows, again, that Buss' account is wholly compatible with our EC criterion (see above). 43 In other words: 'Under such circumstances, pathology takes the place of character' in explaining the agent's behavior (Buss 2012: 673 Still, that's not the whole story, though. Buss (2012: 686) refers to the basic compatibilist point that 'nothing can do anything unless it already is something, and that to be something is to have characteristic ways of behaving'. You need some identity in order to act at all. As we will argue in the following, nudging may be problematic in compromising the way agents form their identity in the first place. Put differently: Given a personal identity, genuine nudging would do little harm -but outside that assumption, it may be problematic.
Here's why.
ACTION AS SELF-CONSTITUTION, NOT CHOICE PRODUCTION
Analyzing the ethics of nudging under the assumption that agents have given identities is ultimately pointless. Nudging quite obviously influences agents' processes of preference (and, hence, identity) formation, which makes it necessary, when studying the ethics of nudging, to 'endogenize' those processes. Buss' account of autonomy, sketched above, can be seen as a first step toward that goal: On her view, what's crucial about autonomy is that an agent is able to let his character effectively shape his preferences -as we have seen, that ability can be negatively affected by debilitating circumstances such as mania. Buss however neglects the question of how agents acquire their character in the first place -conceding only that the way they do so may, under extreme circumstances, be inimical to autonomy qua violating the minimal human flourishing condition (Buss 2012: 688) . 46 How, then, can we endogenize character formation? To be sure, some contributions to the ethics of nudging target its character-moulding effects as well, albeit somewhat sparsely. 47 In order to incorporate this aspect more systematically into the ethics of nudging, let's see how James Buchanan and particularly Christine Korsgaard have elaborated upon a theory of agency that focuses on the problem of character formation. 45 Note that this holds for public nudging (which we assume to be transparent, see above). Private nudging may be 'manipulative' by virtue of operating 'behind people's backs'. We would however only consider an agent to act heteronomously -given her information -if she were in the grip of Buss' debilitating conditions. 46 As she puts it, in the unlikely event (read: thought experiment involving hypnosis or brainwashing) that some 'mad scientist blocks whatever relatively stable psychological dispositions are constituents of [an agent's] identity', this undermines autonomy, for 'having no ... psychic identity of any kind ... is incompatible with being a minimally well-functioning adult human being ' (ibid.: 687f.) . 47 See, for instance, Bovens (2009: 214f.) on the risk that nudging 'infantilizes' people or 'fragments' their selves. Wight (2013: 130-32 ) comes closest to account for the importance of character formation in his critique of nudging. Sometimes, Mill's arguments on the value of active choice in promoting learning ('experiments in living') and building character is adduced in this context (e.g. ibid., Binder 2014). But see FN 50, below.
'Make yourself into someone!'
Let's start with Buchanan. Famously, he rejects a justification in terms of the individual's epistemic privilege of the liberal order in general and of autonomy ('consumer sovereignty' in economese) in particular by arguing that '[t]he "individual", as described by a snapshot at any given moment, is an artifactual product of choices that have been made in prior periods, both by himself or herself and others' (Buchanan 1999b: 287) . He elaborates upon this notion in his Natural and Artifactual Man, where he hypothesizes that what is special about human beings is our 'sense of "becoming", i.e. of becoming different from what we are' (Buchanan 1999a: 247) . In our roles as artifactual beings, we partly construct ourselves, i.e. our own character. In economic terms, then, choice can be understood as an investment in becoming someone different (ibid.: 252). This goes beyond the well-known fact that agents may use preferences in order to signal some desired identity to others (consider your latest purchase of an Apple device). This artifactual nature of man grounds the notion that adult human beings are expected to assume responsibility for their own choices (ibid.: 257). 48 Buchanan's conception of individuality is strikingly reminiscent of what Davis (2014) refers to as 'bounded individuality' in the 'old' behavioral economics literature (notably Simon).
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Christine Korsgaard (2009) has elaborated upon a closely related account of agency.
She starts from the observation that the human animal is unique in facing the existential challenge to act and, hence, to find reasons in order to guide her actions -as opposed to blindly following instinct, say. Human beings face the task of 'making something' of themselves (ibid.: xii), i.e., of constituting their identity through active choices. This life-long personal project is also the source of normativity -as Korsgaard argues, it presents humans with the formidable task to create and maintain psychic unity which makes actual agency possible. Put differently, action (as self-constitution) is tantamount to the project of achieving 48 Rothenberg (1962) has been one of the very few economists trying to elaborate upon the notion of consumers' sovereignty from such a viewpoint -when arguing, for instance, that '[c]onsumers' choices may not reflect their true tastes; but … maybe these tastes cannot accurately be known; or … they are not really "owned" but only "loaned" tastes anyway, passed on from one person to another. What really can belong to the self and be accurately known is the experience of making and taking responsibility for choices, whether right or wrong, and seeking to know by this continuing dialogue across the permeable boundary of the self what if anything is worth preserving. It is possible that this quest, given any reasonable degree of responsiveness in the outside world, is what consumers want more than being given what they are told they really want.' (ibid.: 282f., emphasis added) 49 Davis (2014: 8f .) describes Simon's account of individuality as 'bounded' in the sense of being co-determined by external environmental factors. By interacting with their environment, agents reconstitute themselves over time. In contrast, in Kahneman's 'new behavioral economics', individuality is elusive: the individual risks elimination, due to inconsistent preferences, through either being money-pumped out of existence or fragmenting into multiple selves.
and maintaining a unified will or personal integrity over time. As Korsgaard puts it, '[w]e must act, and we need reasons in order to act. And unless there are some principles with which we identify we will have no reasons to act' (ibid.: 23f). An action of mine can be considered to be 'my own' (to be expressive of my identity) to the extent that it results 'from my entire nature working as an integrated whole' (ibid.: 18f., emphasis added). Note the procedural understanding of character in this quote.
It is important to stress the difference of this Buchanan-Korsgaard (henceforth BK) view to the approach, dominant in modern ethics (and also subscribed to by Buss, see above), which understands action as the production of something 'external' such as a choice, that is then subject to evaluation. As Korsgaard argues, that approach has been the one favored by Mill (ibid.: 8f. ). An action would, then, be judged good to the extent that the choice -or, in
Mill's case, also the preferences -produced by it were judged good.
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From the perspective advocated by BK, though, action is self-constitution, i.e., a person's 'identity' is not simply a state that has to be achieved first and from which action then issues, but a continuing process (ibid.: 43f.). 51 Then, however, it becomes obvious that the two Kantian imperatives of practical reason, viz., the Categorical and the Hypothetical Imperative, obtain compelling normative force for any human being struggling to maintain psychic unity. Hence, an action -comprising, as a package, both a specific act and a specific end (ibid.: 11f.) -would fail to promote the agent's psychic unity or integrity if it was either expressive of 'alien forces' or instrumentally non-effective (ibid.: 84). It is expressive of 'alien forces' to the extent that the agent fails to 'be something over and above the forces working within her' (ibid.: 134) -due to lack of principles. In that case, she lacks a unified will and her mind can best be characterized -paraphrasing Aristotle -as a mere 'heap of premises ' (ibid.: 67) . Korsgaard (2009: 168f.) illustrates this case with fictitious college student 'Jeremy', who, being unable to shape his will, stumbles through life, blindly following accidental impulses (a 'play of incentives' inside the mind, see ibid.: 76).
Obviously, nudging may contribute to a situation of 'excessive convenience' resembling Jeremy's predicament, where agents are systematically discouraged from 'shaping their will' and exercising active choice. Therein lies the key problem. Note that excessive outsourcing of self-government -or, rather, excessive outsourcing of agency -may result in a 50 Hence, while Mill may be interpreted as putting emphasis on the character-building function of active choice (see above), his account of agency seems ultimately incompatible with the notion of 'improving character '. 51 Note that this shows how Korsgaard's notion of psychic unity differs from Bovens' notion of coherence (see above). Bovens focuses on the overall structure of preferences at a given moment in time -Korsgaard, though, understands the quest for psychic unity procedurally: It may involve temporarily crazy-looking structures, but make sense eventually as expressing the idiosyncratic struggle to balance conflicting personal roles and responsibilities. In a sense, it may express the ongoing aim to realize 'subjective coherence' (Schubert 2015 What does all this imply for the ethics of nudging? We have to see whether and when nudging affects people's motivation and ability to pursue the project of self-constitution described by BK, i.e., to engage in active choice.
Some implications
Being equipped with an account that, we submit, grasps the true normative costs of nudging, let's briefly outline its basic implication for nudging, and then elaborate upon four key implications, ranging from the most applied to the most abstract.
The insight that it's agency, rather than autonomy that's at stake in nudging gives us a framework in which to discuss the ethics of nudging in a way that avoids intricate notions such as 'manipulation'. At the operational level, we should rather focus on convenience: The optimal level of nudging in a given life domain -say, old-age savings, food intake, smokingresults from a trade-off. Let's simplify: On the one hand, there can be 'too little' (public) Put differently, choice architecture is Janus-faced: While it's needed to constitute agency, it can also compromise it. To illustrate, consider the simplification of government agency forms or the correction of objectively erroneous risk assessments (measures that help agents make instrumentally effective choices) on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the rearrangement of food in cafeterias, relieving agents from the burden of self-control.
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Behavioral policy -concerned, as it is, with the redesign of choice architecture -needs to find the right balance between insufficient and excessive nudging. This balance is obviously domain-specific. Let's briefly elaborate upon some implications of the BK account of agency.
(1) To make our criterion operational, we need a yardstick that separates those cases or life domains where it seems worthwhile to allow some active choice to be discouraged in the present (for the sake of enhanced possibilities to choose in the future), from those domains where this might not be the case. Here's a suggestion: With respect to the paternalistic use of nudging (its non-paternalistic use seems to be, grosso modo, unproblematic anyway), 54 we could use Rawls' list of primary goods: These are goods every human being has reason to desire, whatever specific overall conception of the good life she otherwise pursues. Note that this would significantly restrict the realm of nudging deemed legitimate, compared to what LP has in mind. There are certain domains where it's plausible to presume that a large majority of citizens benefits from contextual support -from partially 'outsourcing their agency' -in order to minimize the risk of severe distress later in life. Thus, for instance, nudges might be considered to be less of a threat to agency overall when it comes to basic retirement savings or severe health risks. 55 On the other hand, the balance between normative costs (in terms of agency) today and potential benefits tomorrow may look differently in those domains where people's preferences are heterogeneous: Consider post-mortem organ donation, savings beyond some basic level, but also Thaler and Sunstein's notorious cafeteria case.
53 A somewhat trivial example is provided by GPS (a non-nudge, see above): It's obviously helpful in promoting agents' instrumental effectiveness (one of Korsgaard's conditions for successful agency), but may also erode agents' capacity to shape their own will when -literally -navigating the world (e.g. www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/08/17/our-brains-pay-price-for-gps/d2Tnvo4hiWjuybid5UhQVO/story.html (accessed october 11, 2015) . 54 See Korobkin (2009) and Nagatsu (2015) on 'social nudges' that encourage the provision of public goods. 55 More intrusive regulatory tools might of course be considered, but here we are only concerned with nudging.
(2) As we have argued in the Introduction, the ethics of nudging can best be examined outside the narrow confines of Libertarian Paternalism. 57 The notion of active choice may also be easier to measure than whether someone's actions are unduly influenced by 'outside elements'.
(in its specific domain). This may affect the agent's ability to 'shape his will'. On the other hand, it may be argued to facilitate the agent's self-constitution by virtue of helping to prevent financial distress in old age. Moreover, nudges in this particular domain don't threaten agents' moral integrity -as opposed to, say, the much-cited case of default change in the domain of post-mortem organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein 2013) . Thus, we suggest that nudges fostering old-age savings do not, on balance, compromise agency, let alone autonomy, properly understood.
(4) Finally, consider a key advantage of the Buchanan-Korsgaard account: it's robust, in two respects. First, it does not violate our EC criterion -it can obviously be coherently applied in the behavioral world in which nudging is supposed to operate. What's more, it also satisfies a second criterion that has already briefly been mentioned at the end of subsection 3.1, namely, the criterion of Independence of Epistemic Privilege (IEP): We submit that in order to be useful in the context of nudging, any conception of agency (or autonomy, for that matter) must be independent of specific empirical assumptions on the individual agents' epistemic privilege relative to some third party. Specifically, it should not presuppose that the individual agent exposed to nudging -the 'nudgee' -is systematically better informed about his own preferences than some external 'nudger'. Note that in many of life's domains, algorithms steering behavior can already today be safely assumed to 'know' and predict human agents' preferences (and even their 'character') better than the agents themselves. Thus, it may not be utopian to imagine an external body issuing nudges that are technologically perfect in the sense that they can channel people's behavior in a way that's in line with their own deepest commitments, i.e., that improve agents' welfare, as judged by themselves. 58 The notion of mere 'autonomy' would then not suffice to signal the normative costs associated with such kinds of nudging.
The Buchanan-Korsgaard account of agency, though, allows us to see these costs:
People subject to technologically perfect nudging would risk losing their motivation and ability to engage in active choice, i.e., self-constitution. They would risk losing their identity as recognizable human agents, rendering the very notion of technologically perfect nudging ultimately self-defeating. By dropping the assumption of a 'given character', we can remain unimpressed with the promises of technological progress in the realm of behavioral algorithms.
58 Consider the notion of 'smart' (personalized) nudges introduced in Smith et al. (2013) .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The debate on the ethics of nudging (and public policy's cost-benefit calculus hopefully informed by it) should focus on their normative costs in terms of agency, rather than autonomy. That's no academic hairsplitting -the reorientation has important implications for the assessment of behavioral policies more general. Most importantly, we should be worried about the way nudging discourages active choice, rather than about its 'manipulative' nature.
Put differently, the downside of nudging -and behavioral policies more general -may not be its 'distorting' or 'deceiving' impact on people's preferences, but rather the 'excessive convenience' it may create, a kind of harm neglected in Mill's famous 'harm principle' (Mill 1859: 21f.) . By discouraging active choice, it may discourage people from engaging in the existential (if effortful) task of self-constitution that is at the heart of the very process of preference formation.
The notion that it's agency that's at stake in nudging may give us reason to explore questions that seem highly relevant for the ethics of psychologically informed behavioral interventions (an issue whose future relevance can hardly be overestimated), yet are still largely neglected in the literature. Should public policy -faced, as it is, with individuals displaying inconsistent preferences -abandon its focus on advancing people's 'true' preferences (or, equivalently, promoting 'true' utility) in favor of trying to maintain the complex institutional conditions necessary for agents' ongoing quest for self-constitution? Might the capacity of self-control, so famously cherished by Adam Smith (Bovens 2009 ), be particularly worth promoting? It seems that the project of incorporating psychological insights into economics has made it necessary to also reinvigorate the exchange between economics and ethics.
